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Introduction
The market for derivatives and especially OTC derivatives has increased tremendously over
the last decade (see figure 1). This development has mostly been driven by the increase in
interest rate, FX, and credit derivatives. This is also reflected in the gross market value of
these derivatives (see figure 2). However, according to many commentators, the credit
derivatives and especially CDS have been a leading cause to the development of the current
financial crisis. For example the collapse of AIG, Lehman Brothers, and the financial turmoil
these events caused can be derived from losses on CDS. During the last year, policy makers,
regulators, and other commentators around the world have therefore focused their attention on
how to regulate OTC derivatives and especially CDS.1
Figure 1

Source BIS, trillion $

Figure 2

Source BIS, trillion $
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Background and Purpose
The devastating effect OTC derivatives have had on the economy is by many commentators
ascribed to the general financial deregulation during the end of the 20th century and early 21st
century. As a result of the lax regulation of financial institutions and OTC derivatives, the
market for CDS exploded during mid-2000 and the notional value of all CDS was twice the
amount of global debt issuance during some years (see figure 3). This is of course remarkable
at first sight since a CDS is in essence insurance on the default of the underlying bond or
index. However, such a comparison is false since the notional amount of debt will eventually
be exchange, while the notional amount of CDS is not intended to be exchanged and can
instead be considered as a multiplier or leverage of the insurance. This relationship has
deceived many commentators and policy maker. However, the gross market value of CDS is
on the other hand highly relevant since this could or would eventually be exchanged. The
gross market value of more than five trillion USD is of course highly alarming since financial
institutions suffering losses of only a small fraction of this amount are at risk of default. This
is highly troublesome for regulators since default of financial institutions posses a systemic
risk to the whole economy.2
With this background, the purpose of this paper is to analyze some of the proposed regulatory
responses to OTC derivatives and especially CDS from an economic point of view. The paper
will also propose a twofold regulatory response.
Figure 3

Source BIS, trillion $

Recent Regulatory Responses
Ever since the deregulation of financial market during the end of the 20th century and early
21st century, commentators have argued for the regulation of OTC derivatives and warned
about the systemic risk they pose. These commentators have now of course received increased
recognition.
As a response to the financial crisis and the discussed remedies, the Obama administration has
proposed a number of regulatory responses relating to OTC derivatives during spring and
2
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summer 2009. The proposals are currently discussed by the House of Representatives. Major
parts of the proposals are the following3:
-

-

-

Regulated central counterparties for all “standardized” OTC derivatives with central
clearing, robust margin requirements and risk control. I.e. “standardized” OTC
derivatives would move to regulated exchanges and electronic trading systems.
Customization of OTC derivatives solely as a method to avoid central clearing would
be prohibited.
In order to improve transparency and efficiency, regulators (i.e. CFTC and SEC)
would have access to comprehensive and timely information regarding the trading
position of each and every participant in all OTC derivatives markets.
Tighten regulation and supervision by CFTC and SEC to police fraud, market
manipulation, and other market abuse.

Another regulatory response has been to regulate so called “non-naked” CDS4 in accordance
with insurance regulation. This is the response of the state of New York and this regulatory
oversight begun in January 2009 by the NYSID. The reasoning behind this regulatory
response is that non-naked CDS closely resemble traditional insurance contracts. Since
insurance is regulated on state level in the US, New York Governor Paterson could enact this
regulation. Non-naked CDS might in fact meet or not meet the definition for the “insurable
interest requirement” of the New York insurance law. However, the logic behind treating this
as insurance can be highly questioned on two grounds. First, separating the regulation of nonnaked CDS from naked CDS fragments the regulatory framework. Further, trying to regulate
the globally innovative CDS market where financial engineering can and will blur the line
between what is a non-naked CDS and what is a synthetic non-naked CDS will be difficult.
Secondly, regulating non-naked CDS on a state level will create growing complexities for the
CDS market participants and impede mutual beneficial transactions. This is therefore a
questionable regulatory response.5
In the EU, the European Commission (EC) has during summer and autumn of this year
specified their proposal for regulation of the OTC market. When looking at their proposal it’s
apparent that many of the regulatory responses resemble the proposals by the US Treasury
Department. The main point of the EC’s proposal is centralized counterparty clearing for
“standardized” contracts. The reasons are that this reduces the counterparty risk as well as
increases the transparency and liquidity. The EC recognizes the fact that central clearing is
impossible for all OTC derivatives and therefore intends to make it more expensive to do
bilateral trading of OTC derivatives. The EC further intents to improve product and market
standardization, strengthen bilateral collateral management, and ensure central storage of
contract details.6
The term “standardization”, which is a central theme of both the US Treasury Department’s
and EC’s proposals, is still not defined by the regulators. The EC even admits that this is still
a big challenge even after having gone through a thorough consultation process with market
participants. This is in fact very understandable. The reason is that OTC derivatives are
almost per definition non-standard. In fact, one of the major differences between OTC
3
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derivatives and exchange traded derivatives is that market participants are able to tailor the
derivative instruments according to their own individual needs. Having said this, it should
also be clear that OTC derivatives and CDS can be standardized. This has also happened
following a self-regulatory initiative by the trade association ISDA (the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association) on April 7, 2009. ISDA then launched the so called big-bang
protocol which brought about several changes in order to standardize North American CDS.
The main changes in terms of standardization would be standard fixed coupons (100bps or
500bps), standard coupon dates and accrual dates, standard effective dates and auction
settlement after a default or credit event (so called auction hardwiring).7
The big bang clearly simplified the trading of CDS and as a response to this the so called
small bang protocol was launched on July 14, 2009 for European CDS. This protocol
standardized the CDS market just like the big bang. However, the standard fixed coupons are
more varied and the European CDS still include restructuring events (i.e. no auction
hardwiring). In conclusion, both North American CDS and European CDS have been greatly
standardized with improved transparency and standardization. However, they are far from
identical and the global market therefore remains fragmented. What is equally important to
understand is that these protocols are not mandatory and market participants still trade CDS
that doesn’t follow the standardizations. However, a very positive development in accordance
with the proposals of the US Treasury Department and the EC is that
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) has started to operate as a central clearing house and clears
some CDS.8
Regulation from an Economic Point of View
Following the policy maker’s urgency for tighter regulation of OTC derivatives and the
markets participants’ recent responses it’s natural to investigate why we are in this situation.
As mentioned before, a number of financial deregulations came into effect during the end of
the 20th century and early 21st century. One major thing was the overriding of the long time
common law “rule against difference contracts” in the US and UK. This rule had the effect of
allowing any type of derivatives contracts, but didn’t enforce speculative derivatives wagers.
This rule, dating back centuries, put the burden of proof on the contracting parties to prove
that this wager was in fact a natural hedge for one of the parties in order to have the wager
legally enforced. Since the legal enforcement of wagers was uncertain, speculators took
different counter actions. The speculators’ solutions were often to set up private exchange
with requirements on membership, margins, netting and a number of other mechanisms in
order to ensure that speculative traders would make good on their legally unenforceable
contractual promise. For OTC derivatives, this created a very strong incentive to know your
counterparty and put in place rigorous mechanism in order to ensure that the counterparty
made good on their contract. When this common-law rule was replaced by the Financial
Services Act of 1986 in the UK and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 in the
US, all derivatives contracts became legally enforceable. The market for OTC derivatives
consequently six folded during following seven years (see figure 1).9
The economic rationale for this shift in law was that speculation wasn’t necessarily seen as
negative by many economists and policy makers, in fact, it was even seen as positive by many.
The basis for this is that conventional economic wisdom holds that speculation is
7
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economically beneficial for two main reasons. First, speculation transfers risk away from riskaverse parties (hedgers) to speculators who accept more risk in return for a higher potential
profit. This is the so called risk hedging theory and can also be put in relationship to insurance
theory and pooling of risk theory. The second argument is the so called information arbitrage
argument which posits that speculators who invest in predictive information will allow them
to trade at an advantage compared to less informed parties. Both theories hold that speculation
increased welfare for on the one hand the trading parties (risk hedging) and on the other hand
the general public by improving the accuracy of market prices (information arbitrage).10
One opposing theory is the heterogeneous expectation theory which states that differences in
traders’ subjective expectations is the reason for trading. If individuals only posse different
expectations, due to acquisition and reliance on different information, then speculative trading
distorts welfare. Firstly, trading driven by heterogeneous expectation doesn’t create a real
value for society since trading only reshuffles payoff structures based upon subjective
expectations. Secondly, trading on heterogeneous expectation in fact distorts prices and
therefore blurs the information that can be derived from prices. As a consequence resources
are not allocated optimally.11 Consequently, there are opposing theories for how beneficial
speculation is for the economy and which measures to apply.
Irrespectively of how beneficial speculation in derivatives is, it should be clear that the use of
derivatives can be a two edged sword. On the one hand derivatives are extremely important
risk management tools that are used by almost all major corporations and other parties for
hedging. On the other hand it’s a highly speculative instrument that can generate enormous
positive or negative cash flows for speculators. The reason for their existence is therefore
twofold; because the world we’re living in is uncertain and derivative instruments can help
decrease the uncertainty. At the same time they can generate huge economic profits for parties
who can predict the future well or manage risk well. An over regulation of the OTC
derivatives market can therefore destruct many corporations hedging instruments. A lax
regulation can, as has just been experienced in this financial crisis, expose certain parties to
material risk and thereby pose a systemic risk to others. 12 The challenge for regulator is
therefore to strike a balance between accommodating the beneficial effects of OTC
derivatives trading while restricting the destructive sides of OTC derivatives speculation.
Proposal for Regulating the OTC Derivative Market
One central point in the regulator’s proposals and many commentators’ opinions is that
hazardous speculation in OTC derivatives should be prohibited or harshly regulated in order
to avoid a similar financial crisis. Regulators and commentators have therefore tried to
categorize what is pure speculation and what is a natural hedge. This is a very difficult task
and if the regulators would be unable to separate speculation from hedging, we would end up
with over regulation or under regulation. One practice that has often been deemed as
speculation is naked CDS. In fact, this is not necessarily correct. For example, a naked CDS
can enable an investor who believes that a certain company’s credit profile will improve to
create a synthetic bond without buying the bond. If the bond for example is very illiquid or
otherwise difficult to purchase, the investor can buy a risk free treasury bond and enter a CDS
as a seller of protection on the reference entity. In this way the investor is taking exposure
against the reference entity and receives the deal spread. If the company’s credit profile
10
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improves, the CDS will be “in the money”, i.e. show a positive margin and the investor will
make a profit. This is only one type transaction in which a CDS can be used in a certain
investment strategy. This might be speculation or not. But for a regulator who is observing a
portfolio of a treasury bond and a CDS, it might be difficult to draw a clear conclusion.13
Recognizing that certain judgments might be very difficult for a regulator due to the
innovativeness and complexity of many of the derivatives instruments, the regulator still
needs to do something about the things that went wrong in this financial crisis. Without
making an exhaustive list, it’s probably fair to state that the risk management of many
financial institutions was not what it should have been. Further, many financial institutions
probably invested in instruments, such as derivatives, in a way or to such extent that they
shouldn’t have. When some of these financial institutions later failed, they externalized the
costs of their inadequate risk management and investment strategies to ordinary tax payers in
the form of the state. It’s clearly understandable that tax payers, politicians, and regulators
intend to prohibit this from happening again. The question is just how.
This paper proposes two things. First it proposes that we return to the old common law rule of
“rule against difference contracts”. This would deem all speculative derivatives as legal, but
legally unenforceable unless one of the parties can prove in court that the derivative was a
natural hedge. This would place the burden of proof on the parties to the contract to prove if it
was a hedge and would refrain the regulator from doing such judgments. It’s reasonable to
expect that the counterparties to an OTC derivative would rely less on counterparty reputation
and credit rating and instead introduce robust collateral requirements and risk management
processes. This would increase the costs associated with OTC derivatives for speculator.
The second part of the proposal, which relates especially to CDS, is to simultaneously assist
the market participants establish central counterparty trading. This would include collateral
requirements, daily mark to market, standardization of CDS, etc. This is very much what is
currently happening, however in combination with a rule against difference contracts, the
regulators needs to take less responsibility in the regulatory process.
Discussion
The result of this proposal would be:
-

-

-

13

Less regulation and more self-regulation. This is positive because market participants
would need to find arranges among themselves and the scope for regulators for over or
under regulation is less.
Natural hedgers would only see a small increase in cost for OTC derivative
instruments. Under the proposals by Obama and the EC, natural hedgers would fall
under the same regulatory framework as speculators, i.e. in terms of collateral
requirements, reporting, risk management etc. With this proposal natural hedgers
would be protected by law, but with less regulatory requirements. However, since they
would need to prove themselves as natural hedgers, they would probably have an
increased incentive to take due care when dealing with speculators.
Speculators, like hedge funds, would have great difficulties to enforce their OTC
derivatives as natural hedges. This would induce them turn to exchanges or take on
additional measures to make sure that their counterparties make good of the OTC
derivatives.

Stout (1999), Wallis (2008) and Duffie (2009).
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-

As a result the OTC derivatives and the CDS market would diminish in size and the
exchange traded market would increase and develop innovative solutions.

The merits with this proposal apart from the efficiency gains are that the policy measures are
well known to policymaker and they are probably relatively easy to enact from our current
situation. However, seeing this in a broader perspective, it would be very difficult for
policymaker to explain that the solution to this financial crisis is to entrust the financial sector
with more self regulation. After all, the negative publicity the OTC derivatives have received
and the many misperceptions that are present regarding OTC derivatives and especially CDS,
this proposal would be difficult to enact.
When taking one step back from this debate about regulating CDS, one has to ask: why are
policy makers in particular targeting CDS as a part of their regulation? The main answer is the
huge notional of CDS and their interconnections between financial institutions and the
systemic risk this poses. This is only partially correct. It should be obvious to the reader that
the statistics from BIS in figure 1 and 2 and the discussion in the introduction and background
that credit derivatives are only about seven percent of the OTC derivatives market and interest
rate derivatives are much large. Of course the large gross market value of CDS is highly
worrying, but so should also the high gross market values of interest rate and foreign
exchange derivatives be. One argument might be that certain derivatives might be more
frequently used as a natural hedge and others as speculative instruments. This in combination
with the large gross market values (alternatively: notional value) and the interconnections of
the financial institutions signals that there is a great systemic risk with these instruments. This
might have been the reasons for the US Treasury Department to act in certain ways during the
last two years. When looking at how the US Treasury Department acted in relation to Bear
Stern, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, it’s apparent that they are all highly interconnected with
the financial system and posed system risks. When looking at the same three companies from
their importance to the CDS market, it’s clear that AIG as the major counterparty of CDS was
highly important and therefore strategic important to rescue. However, Lehman who was
much bigger on the CDS market that Bear was not rescued. Following the failure of Lehman
one would then have expected devastating effects following the line of reasoning above.
However, following the Lehman bankruptcy the swaps that Lehman was counterparty to were
settled bilaterally with no descendible effects. Further, the CDS written on Lehman itself,
with a notional of $72 billion, were settled by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation
(DTCC). The settlement was completed without incident, with a total cash exchange among
all parties of $5.2 billion. The conclusion is that Lehman did not pose a systemic risk due to
its role on the CDS market. However, Lehman did without doubt pose a systemic risk due to
other factors.14
However, what might be of concern and what has been proved during this financial crisis is
that CDS has binary and discontinuous pay off structure. However, this is to a large extent
avoided if the CDS are mark to market on a daily basis. This is exactly what an exchange
would achieve. Having said that, policy makers without doubt need to do something about the
OTC derivatives market and the CDS and what has been proposed in this paper is probably
the most reasonable solution after all.

14
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Conclusions
The urgency by many commentators to regulate OTC derivatives and CDS is very misleading.
The primary reason for the current financial crisis was not the use of OTC derivatives; instead
it was the failure of the subprime mortgage market. However, the OTC derivatives, and
particularly failed risk management, have played a large role in leading us to the current
situation. What happened was that economic theory predicted that sophisticated finance
would be able to transfer the risk, through derivative instruments and the market, to those best
able to manage and understand it. However, economic theory failed and risk was instead
transferred to the investors who were neither best able to manage it nor best able to
understand it. But it wasn’t the fault of derivatives; it was the improper use of them. As one
investor puts it, derivatives can be described as “financial weapons of mass destruction”15. It’s
easy for policy makers to blame OTC derivatives, especially following the high costs of the
financial crisis. However, the policy makers are guilty of regulatory failure.
Building upon the misunderstandings of derivatives and the urge by policy makers to act, it’s
easy that the regulatory debate goes out of hand and that misunderstanding about derivatives
leads to miss regulation of the same. One indication of that is that many of the sources found
in this area are unable to describe the implications of CDS correctly. Statistical fallacies and
hasten conclusions are common. The risk is therefore apparent that policy makers will overact
and over regulate OTC derivatives. This would destroy the undoubtedly positive effect OTC
derivatives play for sound risk management in many corporations. As has been urged in this
paper; the challenge is to find the right balance between over and under regulation. The policy
proposal in this paper is a very reasonable way to strike this tradeoff.
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